Showing posts with label Sequence 2. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sequence 2. Show all posts

Thursday, February 4, 2010

Gimmie Some Slack

I like graphs. I like 'em because they make it easy to see trends. But I don't like to look at every little wiggle on a graph and point out significance. Wiggles are wiggles, trends are trends.

This time I go against my better instinct.

I was looking for something on productivity. At the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) I found The Real Economic Crisis by Dean Baker and John Schmitt, dated October 14, 2007.

The focus of the article is "the sharp deceleration in productivity growth since the middle of 2004." Scattered among the comments and insights in the paper is a little history of U.S. productivity. That's my focus here.

From the article:
Between 1947 and 1973, the golden age of postwar capitalism, productivity growth averaged about 2.8% per year in the United States.

From 1973 through 1995, however, productivity growth took a nosedive, with the average rate dropping to just 1.4%.

From the mid-1990s on, however, official productivity growth again accelerated rapidly, returning to a 2.9% rate reminiscent of the golden age. Quite suddenly, though, in the second half of 2004, productivity growth dropped sharply.
In summary:

1947-1973 1973-1995 1995-2004 2004-2007
GOOD NO GOOD GOOD NO GOOD

What accounts for these changes? In particular, what causes the "no good" periods? Baker and Schmitt don't say. They say productivity decline "constitutes a serious long-term threat to US living standards." They say Europeans should "consider these data carefully" before adopting policies similar to those of the U.S. But they don't say what might account for productivity decline.

I'll tellya what accounts for it: DPD, that's what

My DPD ("Debt per Dollar") graph has an interesting fit to the productivity pattern. Debt-per-dollar moves consistently downward during the Roosevelt era, reaching a bottom in 1947. Just as it starts upward, Baker and Schmitt's "golden age" begins.

DPD increases and productivity is good until 1973, when debt reaches a Laffer limit. After that, continuing to increase our reliance on credit does more harm than good. Debt-per-dollar continues to rise exponentially. Productivity founders.

Then around 1990, debt-per-dollar turns briefly down again. Around 1994 DPD turns upward. According to Baker and Schmitt, productivity suddenly "accelerated rapidly."

Debt was beyond the Laffer limit in the 1990s. But a few short years of DPD downtrend relieved some pressure and gave us a decade of "golden age" productivity.

The graph shows a much steeper DPD climb after 1994 than before 1990. It shows our economy using up the slack created by the 1990-1994 downtrend. That slack was exactly what our economy needed in order to grow.

By 2004, the DPD slack was gone, and "productivity growth dropped sharply."

That's my story, and I'm sticking to it.


1947-1973 1973-1995 1995-2004 2004-2007
GOOD NO GOOD GOOD NO GOOD

A Minor Point

That last bit from Andrew Haldane once again:

Debt operates rather like a tax. Debt servicing costs, like a tax, reduce the disposable income of the borrower. Too much debt means a higher debt “tax” and a greater drag on activity – lower lending by banks and spending by households and companies.

The cost of debt is like a tax, because it is a "factor" cost.

My favorite part of The Wealth of Nations is the part where Adam Smith identified the factors of production. Smith looked at the world around him. He saw the land-owning aristocracy, a rising business class, and the commonfolk.

Smith realized that each of these groups received income from economic activity. He knew that these incomes were the costs of production. Today we call those groups "factors" of production, and the costs "factor costs." The well-worn phrase land, labor, and capital identifies Smith's factors; rents, wages, and profits are the costs.

When I look at the world I see one more factor: money. And its factor cost: interest.

The "debt tax" that Andrew Haldane describes is interest, the cost of using other people's money. When you start to look at interest as a factor cost, you start to see the source of our economic problems.

The cost of using money to make a product is included in the price of the product, just as labor costs and resource costs and profits are included. The more the cost of using money embeds itself in prices -- the greater the factor cost of money -- the greater is its effect on life as we know it. And the more we rely on credit, in the economy as a whole, the greater the factor cost of money.

Debt? Debt is simply the evidence of our reliance on credit.

Tuesday, February 2, 2010

Gotta say it (Part 2)

Andrew Haldane (of the Bank of England) says: "What we face today may be called a debt overhang, but what it will feel like is a debt hangover. Like a hangover, it will slow activity in the period ahead."

So Mr. Haldane says excessive debt hurts economic growth. This is a very important point. But let's not call it "debt." For now, let's call it "credit use."

When we have little debt, credit use helps the economy grow. But then, credit use creates debt. And as you know, policy allows debt to accumulate. As debt accumulates, we get closer to the Laffer limit. We get closer to the point where continuing to do the same thing begins to have the opposite effect.

As we approach the limit, we start to lose the advantages of credit use. Economic growth becomes disappointing. Once we reach the Laffer limit, using credit to grow the economy begins to do more harm than good.

That's when we start talking about "debt" again.

Our leaders tweak the system: deregulating, creating incentives for savers, cutting taxes to stimulate growth. And we continue to rely on credit use. And credit use continues to create debt. And we continue to accumulate debt.

We are soon well beyond the Laffer limit. At that point not even magic can make the economy grow like it did in the good old days. Among the excerpts from Haldane on Agrawal's blog is this simple explanation of the effects of excessive debt:

Debt operates rather like a tax. Debt servicing costs, like a tax, reduce the disposable income of the borrower. Too much debt means a higher debt “tax” and a greater drag on activity – lower lending by banks and spending by households and companies.

Or as I said, just this morning:

New uses of credit help the economy grow. That's good. Old accumulations of debt create a cost that hinders economic growth. That's bad.

Not even magic can solve the problem. But the problem is not the new uses of credit. The problem is old accumulations of debt. And there's an easy fix for that.

Gotta say it

I want to thank again the blogger I couldn't find a second time, who put one and one together for me and got this series of posts started. I still can't find him. But I did find a post by Amol Agrawal from August 22 '08.

Agrawal also has a current post that fits the theme of my recent work. He presents a recent speech by Andrew Haldane, Executive Director for Financial Stability at the Bank of England. The BoE's financial stability man is concerned about debt.

Me, too.

The "accumulation of debt" is one of "the root causes of the crisis," Haldane says.

Yep.

"There is a debt Laffer curve," Haldane says.

Sound familiar? ...I said it better, I think.

"The lasting legacy of this crisis is too much debt held by too many sectors against too little capital."

Too much debt (everywhere) compared to (something). "Capital" is a little too vaguely defined for my taste. Haldane wants to "augment capital ratios" -- increase bank stock, basically, relative to bank assets. Haldane is looking at the problem like a banker.

I look at the problem like a citizen. I look at bank "assets" -- all those risky loans; all of the debt, in fact -- compared to the amount of money circulating in the economy. I compare debt to the amount of money we can use to pay off debt.

Haldane knows tons more than I do, I have no doubt. But you don't have to be a banker to know that debt's a problem. And you don't have to be a banker to know that cutting debt cuts the risk associated with debt. And you don't have to be a banker to know you cannot reduce debt by using more debt to pay off debt.

Cut wut?

Simon Johnson of The Baseline Scenario thinks we need to cut the size of our finance industry in half, from 8% of GDP down to 4%. I like Johnson's idea, because it matches up well with what I say in the 12 pages:

A reasonable goal would be to make it so that each dollar of money-money has to support about $20 of credit-money, rather than $35 or $40.

Cut debt by half. That's my plan.

Cut finance by half, that's Simon Johnson's scenario. He's the economist. I'm just a hobbyist. Let's go with his plan. All right then, the Johnson scenario: cut finance by half. Now... Financial products include investment, insurance, and lending.

What shall we cut?

There's nothing we can cut. We need investment. We need insurance. And we need to use credit. So how are we gonna cut our use of financial products in half?

I have a thought: We need the investment, the insurance, the new uses of credit. But we don't need the accumulation of old debt.

We need new debt. We need it for growth. Economic expansion depends on new uses of credit (and using credit creates new debt). But we don't need old debt. Old debt is a burden. It's a drag on the economy. And the more debt we're "managing," the bigger the drag on the economy.

Distinguishing between new uses of credit and old accumulations of debt makes the situation clear. New uses of credit help the economy grow. That's good. Old accumulations of debt create a cost that hinders economic growth. That's bad.

Cut debt by half; that's the plan. Cut old debt; that's the key.

Monday, February 1, 2010

"We are all Kosh"

The title of this post is from an episode of Babylon 5

From Economics by Campbell R. McConnell:
When a bank makes loans, it creates money.
McConnell expects his reader to find this "a startling fact." (I remember being startled by it, back in 1977.) And this:
It is through the extension of credit by commercial banks that the bulk of the money used in our economy is created.
He calls it "bank money." And this:
It seems logical to inquire whether money is destroyed when the loans are repaid. The answer is "Yes."

I have three thoughts:

1. On the internet

Most of the time when I see the "banks create money" idea on the internet, it is associated with the phrase "fractional reserve banking" and seems to be considered some sort of criminal activity.

I won't argue the point, except to say I don't see how it could be criminal, since it is common and public and built into the institutions and the fabric of society. And it's not some great secret kept hidden from everybody; all you have to do is take an economics class to learn about it.

Anyway, the problem is not that banks create money and debt. The problem is the excessive accumulation of bank-money or credit-money or debt, relative to the quantity of M1 (money in circulation).

2. What happens to a dollar

What happens to a dollar of bank money during its lifetime? It works just like real money (because it is money). Maybe it was your boss who took out the bank loan, to meet payroll. So, you get paid this week with "bank money." Maybe cash, maybe payroll check, maybe direct deposit, it's still bank money, created when your boss borrowed it.

Do you feel cheated? I don't see why. Would it be better if the boss gave you a hand-written IOU or a verbal promise to pay you in a week or two? I don't think so.

It doesn't matter that the money you receive may have been created that very day by a bank lending it to somebody. In fact, it has probably happened to you without your even knowing about it.

3. Like the Fed

Across the top of a dollar bill it says "Federal Reserve Note." The dollar is issued by the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve is called "the Fed."

Picture the Federal Reserve buying assets from the public. The sellers receive "new" money for the assets they sell. That money stays in the economy until the Fed starts to worry about inflation, and decides to sell some assets and take money out of the economy again.

Picture me borrowing money from the bank. It's new money we create, the bank and I, and when I receive that money and buy something, I'm putting new money into the economy. Exactly like the Fed does.

When I make a payment on that debt, I capture circulating money and take it out of the economy again. Exactly like the Fed does. If I choose to make only the minimum payments, the money I put into the economy stays in circulation for a long time. Only when I take a dollar and use it for debt repayment -- only then -- does my money come out of the economy. Just like at the Fed.

We are, each of us, a little version of the Federal Reserve.

Sunday, January 31, 2010

Something old, something new, something borrowed...

There's a commonly used phrase -- debt and deficits -- that is sometimes a source of confusion. But there is a simple difference between "debt" and "deficit." A deficit represents new borrowing. Debt is the total amount of borrowing accumulated and not yet repaid.

"Debt" is old debt. "Deficit" is new debt. That's the significant difference.

But I don't care about the phrase "debt and deficits." Everybody else has talked that to death. I want to focus on the descriptive words new and old. New debt is a use of credit that boosts economic activity in the current year. Old debt is a measure of the hangover from credit-use. It burdens economic activity every year thereafter, until it is paid off.

If a new use of credit is yin, then the resulting debt is yang. If a new use of credit is a bonus for economic growth, the resulting debt is a penalty. New debt is not the problem. Failure to repay debt is the problem. Debt management is the problem.

The little graph shows the annual addition to "credit market debt outstanding" as a portion of the total. The addition is almost never more than ten percent of total. 90% of our debt is old debt. If we want to cut debt, there's plenty of old debt to cut.

If we want to reduce the size of the finance industry, we can cut old debt.

Every problem is an opportunity. For any number of reasons, we want to reduce debt.
Well, we are in luck. There is plenty of debt to reduce. Plenty of opportunity. We just need to abandon debt accumulation as a policy, and adopt a policy of debt repayment in its place.

Saturday, January 30, 2010

Debt Management

I discovered "debt management" in December, 1992, in the Encyclopedia of Economics. According to that book, debt management is a strategy used by national governments and others who wish "to maintain a permanent total volume of debt."

"To maintain a permanent total volume of debt."

Let's put that in perspective. In his 1996 book The Truth about the National Debt, Francis X. Cavanaugh -- "the senior career executive responsible for debt management policy advice in the Treasury Department" -- wrote:

"We have never raised the taxes needed to pay off the World War II debt and probably never will; we just keep rolling it over, refinancing with issues of new Treasury securities to replace the old securities as they come due."

Rolling it over, not paying it off. That's how debt accumulates. It's why debt needs to be "managed." But debt accumulation and debt management didn't begin in the 1990s. Thirty years earlier, Time magazine observed that people no longer expect

"that Government will ever fully pay off its debt, any more than General Motors or IBM find it advisable to pay off their long-term obligations; instead of demanding payment, creditors would rather continue collecting interest."

Creditors would rather continue collecting interest. As Oscar Wilde said, "It is better to have a permanent income than to be fascinating."

Permanent income. Perpetual debt. The Skeptical Optimist summarizes the notion of debt management:

This is perfectly sound financial practice. Successful businesses roll over their long-term debt all the time, just as the federal government has been doing for generations.

Everybody thinks accumulating debt is okay. And, well, it is okay, until it becomes a problem.

Maintaining a permanent total volume of debt. Rolling it over. Refinancing. Providing a permanent income to our creditors. Debt management, they call it. An ironic term, surely. Like methadone maintenance, it keeps us on the stuff forever.

I Love My Job

I get to sit at a desk, use AutoCAD all day, and draw. (And they call this work!) And I create little utility programs in VBA, hook them up to toolbar buttons, and use those buttons to make my job faster and easier. Maybe not everybody would like this job. But I sure do.

I don't work for a company that makes drawings. I work for a company that makes stuff out of wood and metal parts. My job is to find out what the boss wants, or what the customer wants, and translate that into something useful for the guys in the shop, the guys who create the stuff we sell.

My job, really, is to make it faster and easier for the company to produce the stuff we produce. I don't produce the stuff myself. I facilitate production.

You have to know by now. This post is some kind of analogy. Yep: I'm like the finance industry, producing paper that helps the work get done.

In our economy we have the productive sector and the finance sector. The finance sector is like me, producing paper that facilitates production. The productive sector is like our shop, where the real work gets done.

My boss could decide to close the shop, and produce drawings for other companies instead. That would make our company like... like the Cayman Islands, say, where the only industry is finance. Some companies do that. But not every company can do it. If nobody's making things, then nobody needs the paper.

There has to be balance between production and facilitation, production and finance. If too many guys are making drawings in our economy, some will go out of business. That's the "invisible hand" at work.

But the invisible hand doesn't seem to work for finance. When Ford makes more money financing cars than it does making cars, it's a sign that finance plays too big a role.

For some reason when we get too much finance, finance becomes more profitable than production. This draws more people and more money into finance and makes the imbalance bigger. The imbalance grows until it is unsustainable.

And then you get a financial crisis.

If this is true -- if the imbalance between finance and production creates serious economic problems -- then there must be a Laffer Limit for finance. There must be a point at which continuing to do the same thing begins to have the opposite effect.

There must be a best point, or a best range, where we have just the right balance between finance and production. That is the point where finance facilitates the most production. Increase finance a little more, and the cost of finance begins to add too much to the cost of doing business. And then economic growth will be less than expected -- except in the finance industry.

I couldn't begin to guess what the perfect-balance point would be. But I know we have too much finance per unit of production. So I say set a target: shoot for cutting debt by half. Shoot for cutting finance in half. Simon Johnson of The Baseline Scenario says the same. He thinks finance should be about 4% of GDP, not 8% as it is today.

Tuesday, January 26, 2010

The Laffer Limit

I woke up at 4:30 this morning with the phrase "Laffer Limit" in my head. So I googled it. Google turned up 38 hits, but only listed 14. The rest were "very similar."

Of the 14, 9 had the word tax (or taxes or taxation) in the text displayed along with the search results. One of the others had the phrase "the top rate on earned income." And one contained "not a moral license for government to take as much as it can." So eleven of 14 hits -- 78.6% -- are immediately identifiable as related to tax issues.

Of the remaining three, one is a URL with no text. One concerns the passing of Robert Novak. And one links to a Google book. I'm betting these three also associate the phrase "Laffer Limit" with taxes. That would make all of the results tax-related.

The Laffer Curve was all about taxes. It was a sort of shared experience, a simple, profound analysis that we intuitively understood, and it held out the promise of lower taxes.

The Laffer Curve was all about taxes. But the Laffer Limit is a practical maximum. In one of those Google hits, J.H. Cochrane refers to "the 'Laffer limit' of taxation." That suggests there can be Laffer limits on things other than taxes.

If you are a government trying to raise revenue, increasing the tax rate brings in more revenue up to a point; beyond the Laffer Limit it brings in less revenue.

If you are a gardener fertilizing your flowers, adding more fertilizer improves the garden up to a point; beyond the Laffer Limit it starts ruining the garden.

If you watch an economy using credit for growth, using more credit increases growth up to a point; beyond the Laffer Limit it starts ruining the economy.

The Laffer Limit refers to the notion of a practical maximum.


Laffer Limit: The point at which continuing to do the same thing begins to have the opposite effect.

Updated 30 Jan 2010

Saturday, January 23, 2010

Simon Says...

Allow me to repeat part of Simon Johnson's statement (from Thursday's post):

The issue is not finance per se, i.e., the process of intermediation between savings and investment. This we obviously need to some degree. But do we need a financial sector that now accounts 7 or 8 percent of GDP?

In other words: We need finance. But we don't need it to be such a big part of our economy as it is today.

I agree.

Here, from a year-old post by ContraHour on Seeking Alpha, is a glance at how big finance has become:


The topmost trend-line shows the accumulation of total debt. At the right-hand side, the next one down from the top is "Domestic Financial," equivalent to Simon Johnson's "modern finance."

At the right-hand side, the most recent numbers show domestic financial debt is the biggest component of the debt. At the left-hand side, the oldest information shows domestic financial debt as the smallest component. Clearly, domestic financial debt has been the fastest-growing component of debt.

Finance is the cancer.

Thursday, January 21, 2010

The Larger Problem

This is a follow-up to yesterday's post, which took brief excerpts from a post by Simon Johnson of the Baseline Scenario. Here's the complete post by Simon Johnson, and my thoughts along the way:

The Nature of Modern Finance

Is modern finance more like electricity or junk food? This is, of course, the big question of the day.

If most of finance as currently organized is a form of electricity, then we obviously cannot run our globalized economy without it. We may worry about adverse consequences and potential network disruptions from operating this technology, but this is the cost of living in the modern world.

On the other hand, there is growing evidence that the vast majority of what happens in and around modern financial markets is much more like junk food – little nutritional value, bad for your health, and a hard habit to kick.


Really?? We're talking about the roots of most serious economic problem in eight decades here, and we're comparing finance to electricity and junk food? Simon Johnson's "big question of the day" -- What a disappointment!

Not to be rude, but it's no wonder we can't solve our economic problems. We can't even discuss those problems intelligently. You would never -- never -- find Adam Smith or Alexis de Tocqueville or John Maynard Keynes using such dumbed-down comparisons.

"Electricity" is a necessity. "Junk food" is a problem. Neither "necessity" nor "problem" is a technical term. Neither requires that readers be coddled. I don't mean to criticize Mr. Johnson's writing style. But ideas are expressed in words. The better the words, the better the expression.

Is modern finance a necessity or a problem? That's a better question, but still not a good one. Unfortunately, modern finance is both a necessity and a problem.

That is the larger problem.

The issue is not finance per se, i.e., the process of intermediation between savings and investment. This we obviously need to some degree. But do we need a financial sector that now accounts 7 or 8 percent of GDP? (For numbers over time, see slide 19 in my June presentation.)

We "obviously" need "some" finance in our economy, Johnson says. He is concerned about excessive finance, as I am concerned about the excessive reliance on credit. It's the same concern. We should see eye-to-eye on this.

As far as we know, finance was about 1 or at most 2 percent of GDP during the heyday of American economic innovation and expansion – say from 1850. The financial system of the nineteenth century worked well, in terms of mobilizing capital for new enterprises.

Ah, but modern finance does not exist solely for the purpose of "mobilizing capital for new enterprises." As I said on the 15th:

Used to be, we'd use credit for growth. And for special circumstances.
Now we use credit for everything.

Modern finance. The mature economy. Excessive reliance on credit. We use credit for everything, and that creates problems.

For some reason, Mr. Johnson can only almost see this larger problem.

Those banks had much higher capital-asset ratios than we have today. Even the dominant players were smaller in absolute terms and relative to the economy – JP Morgan, at his peak, employed less than 100 people.

No one is suggesting we go back to the nineteenth century (although abolishing our central bank would certainly have undesirable consequences in that direction). But is it really healthy – or even sustainable – to have a finance sector as large as what we face today? (It is surely not a good idea for finance to account for 40 percent of total corporate profits, see slide 16 – such performance, in an intermediate input sector, suggests someone else in the economy is being severely squeezed.)


Someone else is being squeezed. This is such an important point. It ought to be emphasized, not buried at the bottom of a paragraph that spans centuries with three dashes, two sets of parentheses, an unanswered question, and one technical drizzle of syllables ("an intermediate input sector").

Someone else is being squeezed. In other words, the profit flowing into finance is flowing out from somewhere. (Profit is income, by definition.) Income elsewhere in the economy is less, because profits are so great in the financial sector. In the twelve pages I wrote:

The growing cost of interest [in the economy as a whole] left less to divide up as wages and profits. Wages and profits both suffered as a result.

Simon Johnson speaks of "profit" where I write of "cost." He speaks of the "financial sector" where I write of "interest" as a factor cost. Our words differ, but we describe the same phenomenon. We see the same problem: excessive reliance on credit.

There is a great deal of research that finds finance is positively correlated with growth, but this work has a couple of serious limitations – if you want to derive any robust implications for policy.

First, it is about the amount of financial aggregates (e.g., money or credit, relative to GDP) rather than the share of financial sector GDP in total GDP. I know of no evidence that says you are better off with a financial sector at 8% rather than, say, 4% of GDP.


Johnson objects to research that looks at not-quite-the-right numbers. He objects to evaluating "money or credit, relative to GDP." He prefers to look at "financial sector GDP." But as credit-use grows, so grows the financial sector. I think the objection here is minor. (It matters to me, because my oft-repeated "excessive reliance on credit" is probably a financial aggregates thing.)

Second, the research shows correlations not causation. So all we really know is that richer countries have more financial flows relative to GDP, not that more finance raises GDP in any linear fashion. Attempts to dig into causation tend to show that financial development is not the bonanza that it is cracked up to be.

Third, we know finance can become “too big” relative to an economy. Ask Iceland.


Ask Iceland? (I guess I do object to Simon Johnson's writing style, after all.)

The work in this area is still at any early stage. Given what we’ve seen over the past 12 months, which way should we lean: towards believing in the positive power of finance, until the opposite is proven; or towards being skeptical of finance in its modern form, until we see evidence that this actually makes sense?

I can't believe he says "The work in this area is still at any early stage." I can't believe he's only looking back "over the past 12 months." And I can't believe he offers only the two absurd extremes: "believing in the positive power of finance, until the opposite is proven," or disbelieving in the positive power of finance, until the opposite is proven.

The extremes are the problem, after all.

Too much is too much. Yes, finance is good, but too much finance is not good. People know this. People have been up in arms about debt since the 1980s. People know when it is too much. But Simon Johnson, the "authority on financial crises," is considering only the past twelve months. And he's saying the work is still at an early stage.

Surely out skepticism should extend to financial innovation. Show me the evidence that this kind of innovation really adds value, socially speaking – rather than providing a very modern way to extract amazing “rents”.

By Simon Johnson


I'm just disappointed, that's all. I finally find a guy who has been nose-to-nose with the economic problem. But it turns out he doesn't know what the stink is.

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

Yeah, idunno

I read somethin' the other day, online somewhere. Somethin' like this:

Finance accounts for 8% of GDP, but 40% of the profits.

It's not new news, but it finally clicked for me. So I spent an hour trying to track down the source, to no avail. But along those same lines, I did find this:

Profits from the financial sector comprise an even larger percentage of our GDP since the crisis erupted. Johnson thinks their share of corporate profits, which was an astonishing 40% in 2003, may actually be higher now, given that the rest of the economy is in bad shape. Banks have doubled their share of GDP to 8% from 4%, he said.

-- from an article by Jennifer Schonberger (October 8, 2009) at The Motley Fool. The Johnson noted therein is Simon Johnson:

Johnson is an authority on financial crises like this one. He's the former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, a professor at MIT's Sloan School of Management, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, and co-founder of The Baseline Scenario.

And then there is The Nature of Modern Finance at The Baseline Scenario, written by Simon Johnson (September 1, 2009):

But is it really healthy – or even sustainable – to have a finance sector as large as what we face today? (It is surely not a good idea for finance to account for 40 percent of total corporate profits... – such performance, in an intermediate input sector, suggests someone else in the economy is being severely squeezed.)

And this:

I know of no evidence that says you are better off with a financial sector at 8% rather than, say, 4% of GDP.

So, yeah, finance accounts for 8% of the GDP, and 40% of the profits. The evidence comes from Simon Johnson, from the Baseline Scenario, and the Motley Fool. But the organizing of the evidence in a striking way waited for the blogger whose work I could not find a second time.


I would have thought finance was more than 8% of GDP. Still, it's twice what it was. That's significant. And if you figure none of the lending counts in GDP -- only the wages and salaries of people in the finance business count -- then, yeah, that's one healthy chunk of GDP.

An unhealthy chunk, rather.

I'd call it excessive reliance on credit. Oh yeah, I do call it that.