Thursday, May 9, 2013

Inside and Outside


From Mark Dow and Michael Sedacca at Behavioral Macro:

The Fed does not control the money supply; they control base money (or outside money), which is a small fraction of the broader money supply. In our fractional reserve system, the banks (loosely defined) control the other 90% or so of the money supply (a.k.a. inside money). And the banks have not been lending...

Pretty clear, about inside and outside money, and who controls what.

Wednesday, May 8, 2013

"Medium of Exchange" and "Medium of Account"


Two items from The Coinage of Ancient Rome:

During which emperor's reign was nearly all silver removed from Roman coins?
    Gallienus. When Gallienus (253 - 268 a.d.) became Emperor, the coinage was already very debased. During his disastrous reign almost all silver was removed. He tried to disguise this fact by issuing copper coins which were silver-plated.

The standard gold coin of the early empire was the "aureus." How much gold did it contain?
    About 1/5 oz. Unlike the silver coinage, Roman gold coins continued to be minted from good metal through the history of the Empire, undergoing only minor debasement. The weight of the aureus did tend to fluctuate a bit, but it was usually minted at 60 aureii to the Roman pound, which works out to about 1/5 oz of precious metal.

When wealth is excessively concentrated, little or nothing remains to serve as value in the everyday money of everyday folk. But the gold coins, that's a different matter.

Tuesday, May 7, 2013

Trade Agreements, Trans-national Corporations and the Sovereignty of Nations


Today's post has been rescheduled for tomorrow, to free up your time to read the above-titled post at Another Amateur Economist.

Monday, May 6, 2013

When you hear complaints of weak leadership, remember this:


In the half century before Diocletian, there had been a succession of short-reigned, incompetent rulers elevated by the military; this era of weak government resulted in civil wars, riots, general uncertainty and, of course, economic instability...

To this intellectual and moral morass came the Emperor Diocletian and he set about the task of reorganization with great vigor...

Since money was completely worthless, he devised a system of taxes based on payments in kind. This system had the effect, via the ascripti glebae, of totally destroying the freedom of the lower classes — they became serfs and were bound to the soil to ensure that the taxes would be forthcoming.

Excerpts from Price Fixing in Ancient Rome (Mises Daily: Thursday, June 18, 2009) by Robert L. Scheuttinger and Eamonn F. Butler. (I added the link to Wikipedia.)

Sunday, May 5, 2013

The double-sided excuse


At Mike Norman Economics, Tom Hickey links to Erroneous Use Of The Sectoral Balances Identity [Updated] by Ramanan.

Ramanan reviews Andrew Lilico's Can public sector austerity coincide with private sector austerity?

Ramanan's post is impressive. Andrew Lilico's is not.


Lilico writes:

When we talk about "private sector deleveraging" what do we mean? We mean things like households paying off loans to the bank, or corporates paying off bonds or other loans. The vast, vast majority of such loans are loans private sector agents make to each other. So for every dollar reduction in borrowing made by one household or company, there is one dollar fall in savings by other households and companies.

(Forgive me my Americanisms. Andrew Lilico thinks in British pounds, but I think in dollars. Two places I had to change his word "pound" to "dollar" to help me think.)

Ramanan astutely observes:

Lilico confuses the terms borrowing and saving

He certainly does: For every dollar reduction in borrowing made by one household or company, there is one dollar fall in savings by other households and companies.

If only. If the reduction in demand (caused by the reduction in borrowing by some) was counterbalanced by an increase in demand caused by the reduced saving of others, there need be no recession, no output gap, no increase of unemployment.

Andrew Lilico's error is comparable to Eugene Fama and John Cochrane's as described by Paul Krugman:

Fama and Cochrane are asserting that desired savings are automatically converted into investment spending, and that any government borrowing must come at the expense of investment — period.

But in Lilico's case, the error is created by his use of the word "savings" when the correct word would have been "lending": For every dollar reduction in borrowing made by one household or company, there is one dollar fall in lending by other households and companies.

That much is true. But a reduction in lending is not the same as a fall in savings. A fall in savings implies money moving out of savings and into circulation without an act of lending. It implies a dollar-for-dollar substitution of demand by savers in the place of demand lost when spenders borrow less.

Lilico's simple word-substitution error explicitly describes this dollar-for-dollar shift in demand. Since it is dollar-for-dollar (or pound-for-pound) as Lilico describes it, GDP does not fall as a result of the reduction in borrowing. Output does not fall.

Ramanan writes:

The most fundamental error of Lilico of course is that he holds output constant in his entire argument. When discussing a scenario with sectoral balances, it is also important to keep in mind the behaviour of output.

Amen to that.



Ramanan also points out that

Lilico’s argument seems to think of the budget deficit as exogenous – i.e., under the control of the government but a careful study reveals that this ain’t so.

Yeah... But this depends on one's point of view. The people who call for austerity in government spending obviously think government spending can be cut and cut again. And obviously it can be done: It is being done. So I think Ramanan's argument here is weak. Remember, the object is always to convince people who disagree. Never only to preach to the choir.


My criticism of Andrew Lilico's article is unlike Ramanan's.

Lilico describes the sectoral balances identity:

...whatever the government doesn't borrow from the private sector in its own country it must be borrowing from foreigners.

He calls this "trivial". Then he allows a simplification: "we assume the position relative to foreigners doesn't change." Now the trivial has been reduced to pristine simplicity:

That implies that any reduction in government borrowing must precisely be matched by a rise in household borrowing. Conversely, any fall in household borrowing must be precisely matched by a rise in government borrowing.

Couldn't get much clearer than that. Even I understand it: A given economy, with its particular monetary balances, requires a particular level of borrowing for markets to clear. Notice in the above excerpt only borrowing is considered; not lending.

But Lilico says "the entire argument is utterly confused" from the start. From the off, he says.

Lilico says that private-sector borrowers essentially borrow only from the private sector. Not from the government, he implies out of the blue. Allowing the same simplification Lilico allowed above, let us say *all* private sector borrowing originates in the private sector. So when we speak of private sector deleveraging, he says,

The net change in the indebtedness of the private sector as a whole, relative to ... the government ... is zero.

Now he brings in lending, thoroughly confusing the issue:

Within the private sector, households could pay off all of their debts to each other, and that would (in an accounting sense) make no difference whatever to the net lending of the private sector as a whole to the government.


The goal of the sectoral balances approach is not simply to separate debt by sector. The goal is to see and understand what happens in the economy. In order to see and understand what happens, it is helpful to keep the sectors separate. Adam Smith did something similar when he identified the categories we call land, labor, and capital.

Andrew Lilico's logic is painfully out of focus. Reaching for a conclusion, he writes:

That clever-sounding national accounting identity at the start, once we ignore the external sector, says nothing more than that what the government borrows from the private sector is equal to what the private sector lends to the government

In Smith's day, Lilico would have been calling it foolish to separate labor from capital because what capitalists pay to labor is equal to what labor receives in payment.

Saturday, May 4, 2013

Reading the new issue of Discover


In the recent Discover magazine I turn the page and find this:
Improve Medical Research, Scrap Funding Model

For nearly seven decades, federal agencies and many private funders have financed medical research through competitive grants to individual scientists who submit proposals for particular projects. This system is intended to match available funds with the best researchers and ideas.

But today's competition for limited grant money encourages overly safe research, aimed more at producing positive results to bolster future proposals than at breaking new ground. The current system discourages high-risk, high-payoff science...

I don't need to read any more. I already have a response.

The first paragraph sets the stage by describing the how and why of funding for science. The second paragraph describes problems with that system. Between the two is a transition phrase: "But today's competition for limited grant money..."

That's the problem, right there. The money. Problems with money create other problems. And then people write articles proposing to fix those other problems by changing the way things have been done for seventy years or more.

It may be a way to cope, but it does not solve the real problem.

Friday, May 3, 2013

Opportunity cost


If I spend enough time mowing the lawn and doing yard work, then I don't have enough time to write a post every day for the blog. I hope to catch up this weekend.

Thursday, May 2, 2013

Reverse debasement

Just some loose ends, not a complete idea. But I need a post this morning, so I'll call this a post.

I found a U.S. Silver Coin Melt Value Calculator. They provide a list of silver coins, with face value, weight, percent silver and other data. I typed in a quantity of one for each of the coins on the list.

Total face value: $7.85

Total value of silver: $239.27 (based on the current price of silver just a few days ago).

The value of the silver in those seventeen coins is more than 30 times the face value of the coins.


A Jefferson nickel, containing only 30% silver, contains $1.31 in silver. In a nickel.

But you know what really gets me? The Kennedy half dollar issued in 1964 contains $8.42 worth of silver at recent prices. But the Kennedy half issued in 1965 contains only $3.44 silver. Because after 1964 the silver content dropped from 90% to 40%.

The issue of dimes and quarters containing 90% silver, if I read the list right, also stopped at 1964. I vaguely remember. (I was in high school.) Wikipedia confirms.

Clearly, before 1965 the people in charge of issuing our coins knew they could not continue to issue coins containing 90% silver, or people would melt them down to make money on the silver in the coins. It's Gresham's law: Bad money drives good money out of circulation.

It's also a kind of reverse debasement: The government had to take silver out of the coins, because the coins were getting to be worth less than the silver was worth.

Usually, when I think of debasement, I think of the money becoming worth less because the government reduces the silver content. That's not what happened here.

Wednesday, May 1, 2013

A Krugman meme?


In Government Debt and Economic Growth (Economic Policy Institute, July 26, 2010) Josh Bivens and John Irons write:

The GITD threshold rests on a simple correlation of high debt levels with slower growth, but no evidence on causality is given. This is important given that contemporaneous causality is actually more likely to run in the opposite direction that what is claimed in the report. That is, causality is more likely to run from slow growth to high debt levels, and this alternative explanation is even supported in the GITD data.

In Not to Pile On, But…Correcting Reinhart and Rogoff (On the Economy, Apr 16, 2013) Jared Bernstein writes:

As I’ve written many times, riffing off of Bivens and Irons for one, if you mush everything together they way they do, you’re likely to get the causality backwards. You’ll convince yourself that higher debt leads to slower growth when it’s more often the opposite.

In Debt and Transfiguration (The Conscience of a Liberal, March 12, 2010) Paul Krugman wrote:

I’ve been going through this chartbook somewhat in tandem with rereading the recent Reinhart-Rogoff paper on debt and growth (subs. req.) — the one that’s being widely cited as evidence that bad things happen when debt goes above 90 percent of GDP...

What I think I’m seeing, although I haven’t tested this carefully, is that the causal relationship largely runs from growth to debt rather than the other way around. That is, it’s not so much that bad things happen to growth when debt is high, it’s that bad things happen to debt when growth is low.

This is definitely the case for the United States...

So, as I wrote before,

Paul Krugman argued against the view that a high level of debt causes problems in the economy. Inadequate growth, he said, makes debt appear excessive. He thinks the people who worry about the debt have cause and consequence reversed.

We see now that Josh Bivens and John Irons have the same idea, as does Jared Bernstein, and Arindrajit Dube, and probably many, many others.

I don't care. If you are evaluating the work of Reinhart and Rogoff, evaluating their analysis of Federal debt and its impact on growth, how are you going to deal with the fact that other debt has grown to be a far bigger number than Federal debt, and carries far greater cost?

Do you just assume it away with an implicit ceteris paribus?

The only way to deal with "other" debt is to consider it, in your studies of debt. If other debt is not constant -- and you know it is not -- then by ignoring it you invalidate your own study of central government debt.

In my simple view, the Reinhart and Rogoff study is completely invalid because it ignores debt other than central government debt. In everybody else's view, it seems the R&R study is great, except they got the causality wrong.

So, who has the better argument?