Tuesday, August 7, 2012

Cochrane: The VAT, a libertarian dilemma


From January:

An efficient tax code can also raise a lot more revenue. Dan opposes the VAT (and similar consumption taxes) on that grounds. Yes it looks good to start, but politicians will soon raise the rate to the sky and spend the results...

It's a strking dilemma: should we keep an atrocious tax system to limit the size of government? Is there no way to get an efficient tax system and a limited government?

Catches the eye, no?

No. My eye is on the prior paragraphs, the opening of Cochrane's post:

Dan Mitchell wrote an interesting op-ed in the Wall Street Journal ... highlighting a great libertarian dilemma: is a consumption tax (VAT or similar) a good thing?

Every bit of economic analysis says yes. Economists hate distortions, taxes that lead to bad economic behavior. Our tax system is full of them. Broaden the base, lower the rate, tax consumption not savings, dramatically simplify the code, and you can get the same revenue with much less economic damage.

Dan and Cochrane both, apparently, think it would be good to "Broaden the base, lower the rate, tax consumption not savings, dramatically simplify the [tax] code".

Tax consumption, not savings?

No.

Read more...

Monday, August 6, 2012

On a log scale...


The quantity of base money and the CPI run fairly parallel from WWII to 1982, then veer apart.

Graph #1: Prices and Base Money
You could have just now landed from outer space, and you could still see that there was a significant change -- a significant policy change, probably -- around 1982.

As Staniford said, "it's hard to read changes in small growth rates on a log graph." Still, I think I see a gradual separation of the red and blue lines before 1982. In particular, the gap in the 1970s is twice as wide as in the 1950s!

And there is even more of a widening after 2007.

If you could pick up the blue line intact and move it until its little 1921 peak sat squarely atop the 1921 peak of the red line, you would see a similar -- gradual but accelerating -- separation of the lines from 1921 to 1945.

//

Now, base money and the rate of inflation:

Graph #2: Base Money and the Inflation Rate
There is pretty much a straight-line increase from 1970 to 1990 on the blue line, if not longer. And right in the middle of that invariant increase, inflation dropped away. It's almost like, before 1982 the blue line served as a "bottom" for the red line. And then after 1982, not.

This one is mostly just all visual effects and mathematical coincidences, I think.

Sunday, August 5, 2012

Anatole Kaletsky: How about quantitative easing for the people?


Excellent.

At Reuters, Kaletsky writes:
Giving away free money may sound too good to be true or wildly irresponsible, but it is exactly what the Fed and the BoE have been doing for bond traders and bankers since 2009. Directing QE to the general public would not only be much fairer but also more effective.

Suppose the new money created since 2009, instead of propping up bond prices, had simply been added to the bank accounts of all U.S. and British households. In the U.S., $2 trillion of QE could have financed a cash windfall of $6,500 for every man, woman and child, or $26,000 for a family of four. Britain’s QE of £375 billion is worth £6,000 per head or £24,000 per family. Even if only half the new money created were distributed in this way, these sums would be easily large enough to transform economic conditions, whether the people receiving these windfalls decided to spend them on extra consumption or save them and reduce debts.

Distributing money to the general public was the one response to intractable recessions and liquidity traps that united Milton Friedman and John Maynard Keynes. Their main difference was that Friedman proposed dropping dollar bills out of helicopters, while Keynes suggested burying pound notes in chests that unemployed workers could dig up. Unfortunately modern economics, based as it is on simplistic and misleading assumptions about self-stabilizing markets, has forgotten the insights of these great students of deep economic slumps. In today’s world of electronic money, we would not even need Friedman’s helicopters or Keynes’s ditchdiggers. Just a few lines of computer code – plus some imagination and courage from our central banks.

Or suppose that rather than simply giving money away to people, the money was used to pay down debt for those same people. This solves the debt-deflation problem. It helps people do the main thing we want to do: deleverage.

It increases demand by freeing up income that had been used for paying down debt. And it solves the problem of private sector debt overhang.

In other words, it is the way to restore vigorous economic growth.

Saturday, August 4, 2012

That fits the pattern


"...the Great Depression, which had been going on in England for about ten years by the time it spread to the rest of the world in 1929..." -- from page 36 of The Congruence of Weber and Keynes (PDF, 28pp.) by Norbert F. Wiley, 1983.

I didn't know that.

Set aside the thought that "it spread" from England to the rest of the world, for Milton Friedman argued that the Great Depression started in the U.S. and that you could know this by looking at international gold flows.

We are still left with the news that things in England were not good during the Roaring '20s. That's interesting, I think, because things were not good for the American farmer in the 1920s, either.

The '20s were roaring because they were good years for finance, and little else.

That fits the pattern.

Friday, August 3, 2012

But why, JW? Why "The past 25 years"??


I think of finance as a competitor of the Federal Reserve, when it comes to providing funds to the economy. It follows that the growth of finance, the relative size of finance, and the deregulation of finance play a role in the outcome of that competition.

At The Slack Wire, JW Mason writes:
Textbook macro models, including the IS-LM that Krugman is so fond of, feature a single interest rate, set by the Federal Reserve. The actual existence of many different interest rates in real economies is hand-waved away with "risk premia" -- market rates are just equal to "the" interest rate plus a premium for the expected probability of default of that particular borrower. Since the risk premia depend on real factors, they should be reasonably stable, or at least independent of monetary policy. So when the Fed Funds rate goes up or down, the whole rate structure should go up and down with it. In which case, speaking of "the" interest rate as set by the central bank is a reasonable short hand.

How's that hold up in practice? Let's see:


The figure above shows the Federal Funds rate and various market rates over the past 25 years. Notice how every time the Fed changes its policy rate (the heavy black line) the market rates move right along with it?

Yeah, not so much.

In the two years after June 2007, the Fed lowered its rate by a full five points. In this same period, the rate on Aaa bonds fell by less 0.2 points, and rates for Baa and state and local bonds actually rose.

I tried to duplicate Mason's graph. But I had to guess from a large selection of interest rates. Here's what I came up with. It goes back to the same start-date:

Graph #2: Collected Interest Rates (since 1987)
Eh, it's a pretty good match. (Note that I am using TB3MS, my "proxy" FedFunds series which goes back 20 years beyond FEDFUNDS. (FEDFUNDS is still on the graph, pretty well hidden by the purple line.))

Here's a look at the numbers as far back as they go:

Graph #3: Collected Interest Rates
Click for FRED source page

What I want to do is
1. drop FEDFUNDS from the data, and use the proxy data series.
2. set the proxy series apart, and average all the rest together.
3. compare the FEDFUNDS proxy to the average of the other rates.

JW Mason says market rates do not move right along with the rate set by the Federal Reserve. That is true, if we go by his graph. But his graph only goes back to 1987, and our economy was already well-financialized by then.

I think if we look farther back, to a time when we were less financialized, the graph may show that markets DID move with the Fed rate. Anyway, that's my guess.


Here's what I did:
1. Download the data in the graph, from FRED.
2. Work on the data using Open Office Calc.
3. Eliminate the early years, where there is no FedFunds Proxy for comparison.
4. Reorganize the FRED source columns: move data series with later start-dates farther to the right. (This is for my convenience in selecting cell ranges when figuring averages in Excel.)

This is a lot of data. All monthly, it is 12 times what I'm comfortable working with.

Note: The start-dates of the various interest rates differ. The corporate AAA and BAA begin well before 1934, when the FedFunds Proxy begins. MSLB20 begins in 1953Q1. GS10 begins 1953Q4. And MORTG begins in 1971Q4. The number of interest rates in the average increases as each new series begins.

Hm. I used Open Office Calc to get the size of the graph. Then I went into Paint and set the size of a new, blank picture to the same size. Then I copied and pasted. The vertical bar thickness changed. Several of the vertical bars from Calc did not show up in Paint. And the colors changed.

Graph #4: Wow, that's ugly!

Used the Windows "snipping tool" on the Calc graph, and got this version:

Graph #5: The FEDFUNDS Rate versus an Average of Other Rates

Well that's better.

I don't know if my expectation holds up. It doesn't really look as if market rates moved with the Fed rate, even before the Great Financialization. Actually, it looks like market rates are "sticky down".

The other-rates average (red) is definitely higher than the FedFunds proxy in the two Depression-times, when the FedFunds rate is near zero. And it looks to me that the red and blue are much closer on the up-swing (1946-1982) than on the downswing (since 1982). That could just be because "other" rates are not immediately responsive to changes in the FedFunds rate. (Long term, obviously, they rise and fall together.)

But maybe the two are closer on the rise than on the fall because financialization was lower on the rise than at other times. You can gage the level of financialization on Thomas Philippon's graph and mine, both presented here.  The striking fall in financialization shown on those graphs reaches a bottom in the mid-1940s, just when the up-swing begins on Graph #5.

I don't have the math skills to evaluate the result any better than that. But I can say that this evaluation of interest rates does not contradict my view that private finance competes with the Federal Reserve and that when finance grows large, it circumvents and weakens policy.

Thursday, August 2, 2012

"But you know what? Just look at M2 divided by M1 instead."


Graph 1: M2 divided by M1. (Click for FRED source page.)
The ratio starts out low, and rising. That was during the "Golden Age".

When the Golden Age is over, the ratio runs flat until 1990.

After 1990, the ratio falls sharply for about three years. We've seen this decline before, in the debt per dollar graph.

Mid-'90s, the ratio takes off like a rocket. That was during the "Macroeconomic Miracle".

After the Macroeconomic Miracle, the ratio runs flat, hiccups, and breaks.


When the ratio is low, or relatively low, the economy grows well. But when the ratio is high or relatively high, the economy grows poorly and gives us trouble.

The ratio is an indicator of financialization. A lower ratio means less financialization.

Or again, the ratio is an indicator of financial slack. Higher is tighter.

Or again, the ratio is a gauge of the factor cost of money. Assuming that money in savings is put to use, a higher the ratio indicates a greater reliance on credit and a greater factor cost of money. Remember, the Factor Cost of Money depends not only on the rate of interest, but also on the rate of credit use.

I hate it when I have to disagree with somebody I would have liked to agree with


From Gang8, from Gunnar Tomasson, an excerpt from Wikipedia on the American Monetary Institute:

Research results are published in Zarlenga's 736 page book, The Lost Science of Money.

This book asserts that money did not emerge from barter between individuals, but rather through trade between tribes and as part of religious worship and sacrifice. Though this is not the mainstream view, there are other scholars of money, such as Keith Hart, who agree that money developed in this way. The reason this distinction is believed to be important is because, according to Zarlenga, it is the definition of money which determines how the public will allow the money supply to be controlled.

If money is a commodity to be traded, then all that matters is that the money is 100% backed by some commodity, like gold or silver for example. If money is credit, then it makes sense that bankers control it, as they do in the United States today. But if money is an artifact of law, whose value is derived from law (payment of taxes and legal tender laws) then Zarlenga argues it would only be proper for the government to issue, and control the money supply. According to Zarlenga, it is this last definition that is supported by the history and nature of money.

Zarlenga seems to be arguing in favor of a particular sort of monetary structure for society today, based on one particular event that occurred in the time of cave men.

I find that exasperating. Does no one believe that the economy is a system that functions as a system? Does everyone think we can re-design the economy at will, simply by coming up with a better stupid story about how money was invented??

How money was invented should be the least of our concerns. We should be thinking about where the money went and why we use so much credit and why we have so much debt. The answers come easy, when you ask the right questions.


From the same Gang8: "the financial sector’s assets are the real sector’s liabilities."

Yes, and the financial sector's income is a cost of production. We would do well to reduce that cost.

I find it useful to expand Adam Smith's "factors of production" -- land, labor, and capital -- to include finance. I find it useful to distinguish real sector capital from financial sector capital. Let "profit" be the return to real capital, and "interest" be the return to finance.

I find it useful to examine costs in the economy based on this expanded set of factors.


From the end of the Gang8 remarks:
Ratio of M2 to GDP in selected countries
United States = 83
France = 152
United Kingdom = 171
Netherlands = 226
Japan = 236

See: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FM.LBL.MQMY.GD.ZS

There is no “ideal“ or “normal“ ratio of M2 to GDP. Hence, there would be no benchmark values of M2/GDP to guide US Treasury control over money supply.

Gunnar

I looked at the worldbank link. The figures are for 2011.

Based on one stat from five nations for one recent year, Gunnar Tomasson asserts that there is no ideal or normal ratio of M2 to GDP.

Gunnar should take a look at M2 money for all the years since the crisis, and for all the years leading up to the crisis. And for comparison he should look at M2 money for the years when growth was good: the golden age, the first two decades following the end of World War II.

Gunnar should look at the components of M2 money. Here, I found this recently at Philip George's Philipji.com:

M1 consists of currency and the kind of deposits that can be used to write checks. M2 consists of M1 plus other deposits like savings deposits and time deposits. So subtracting M1 from M2 gives us roughly the amount of money available for lending.

That's a good breakdown of the components of M2. If you want to say "loans create deposits" that's fine, too. Just revise George's last sentence to read:

So subtracting M1 from M2 gives us roughly the amount of money in savings.

Don't lose the focus. It is essential to look at these two components of M2 money, the circulating and non-circulating components.

If Gunnar looked at those components, he would find that when savings is a large portion of M2 and circulating is a small part, the economy does poorly. And that when savings is a small portion of M2 and circulating is a large part, the economy does well.

Too much savings: bad. Too little savings: good.

Graph #1 shows the non-circulating component rising through the Roaring '20s. Non-circ was already high by start-of-data, and the Roaring '20s was more a financial than non-financial success, much like the 1990s.

By the end of the Roaring '20s the non-circulating component was very high, and the result was that we had the Great Depression. During the Depression and World War II, the non-circulating component fell as a share of M2 money and the circulating component increased. Finally, non-circ reached a low point, and the Golden Age began soon thereafter.

Graph #1: The Non-Circulating Component of M2, 1915-1970

On Graph #2 below, the FRED data picks up in the midst of the Golden Age. The non-circulating component starts out low and rising. It tries to level off in the 1970s, succeeds in the 1980s, and falls a bit in the early 1990s. Then it rises again, in a financial success comparable to the Roaring '20s. Then, like the Roaring '20s, it ends in Depression.

Graph #2: The Non-Circulating Component of M2, 1959-2011

If Gunnar looked at those components, he would find that when savings is a large portion of M2, and circulating is a small part, the economy does poorly. And that when savings is a small part of M2 and circulating is a large part, the economy does well.

But you know what? Just look at M2 divided by M1 instead. Excessive non-circ still shows up. And it's simpler to think about.

Wednesday, August 1, 2012

Cochrane: Just how bad is the economy?


I liked his post. Maybe I forgot to say that in my comment?

Seven graphs, Cochrane provides. You know I had to like the post. Interesting vertical scales too: "Real GDP, Percent Relative to Peak", for example.

Cochrane considers the merit of trend lines, compares the RGDP trend to potential output trend, looks at lots of things I've looked at; he looks at them with ease and a writing style that made his post easy to follow. Of course I liked Cochrane's post.

My comment?
Good post (I could follow it:)

Word counts
"private debt" -- zero.
"debt" -- two in the sidebar, none in the post or comments.
"credit" -- zero.
"money" -- one, in the comments.

If financial costs are a drag on growth and productivity, one would not know it from this post.

John Cochrane's reply:
More words missing. Education. Regulation. Cronyism. Marginal tax rate. Give me a break, how many words and graphs do you want in a blog post?

Oh, he gave me a good laugh!

It was a good post, and it was a good comeback. But you know what? Cochrane equates debt and private debt and money and credit with education and regulation and cronyism and marginal tax rates. Just more so-so topics that didn't fit in his post.

It's not like that, for me.

Cochrane's conclusion:

The trends are an economists' horror movie. Real GDP seems not to be recovering at all...

What to do? If only it were so simple as to have the Fed print up another two trillion dollars, or have the Treasury borrow another $5 trillion and blow it on stimulus boondoggles. We're stuck in sclerotic growth, and to everyone but a few die-hard extremists, that means growth-oriented policies are the only way out.

My conclusion? It *is* simple. The problem is debt, excessive private debt. If the question is "What to do?" -- and if it is a serious question -- then more is required than just a great retort.

Growth and the FEDFUNDS proxy


Using FRED's TB3MS as a proxy for the FEDFUNDS rate, this graph compares "percent change from year ago" values for the FEDFUNDS proxy and RGDP.

The numbers are not as close as they look: the red line's on the right scale. However, there does appear to be a high degree of similarity between economic growth and changes in the interest rate -- at least in the years before 1970.


(For much of the time shown on this graph, the actual rate of interest was so low that the changes are difficult to see. That's my reason for showing "percent change from year ago" for the interest rate.)