Sunday, July 22, 2012
Saturday, July 21, 2012
Update
Mine, 1 December 2010:
There is a lot talk these days about debt. Much of it calls for public-sector austerity. Some goes the other way, claiming austerity will do more harm than good.
None of this discussion is useful.
The topic must shift to private debt, to the reduction of private-sector debt. For only the reduction of private-sector debt can bring an end to our economic troubles.
Only the reduction of private-sector debt will remove the barrier to economic growth. And only growth will allow the public debt to fall.
None of this discussion is useful.
The topic must shift to private debt, to the reduction of private-sector debt. For only the reduction of private-sector debt can bring an end to our economic troubles.
Only the reduction of private-sector debt will remove the barrier to economic growth. And only growth will allow the public debt to fall.
Marcus, 21 July 2012:
Lately, the “need for deleveraging” has been elected the major culprit in keeping economic recovery under wraps.
Good to hear it, Marcus.
Mish, apparently, does not.
Okay. First of all I don't understand any of his accounting. But Steve Keen's Mish & Steve Debate: Steve Says (I) -- or the parts of it I do understand -- are superb.
When he's done with all his double-entry tables, Keen writes:
So the bottom line here is that eliminating “Fractional Reserve Banking” does nothing to eliminate the capacity for banks to create money: that will exist in a purely free market system just as much as it does today.
The bottom line is eliminating “Fractional Reserve Banking” does nothing to eliminate the capacity for banks to create money.
I would say, you cannot eliminate fractional reserve banking any more than you can eliminate gunpowder or nuclear weapons or the sunrise. Fractional reserve banking existed long before the Federal Reserve. It will continue to exist long after we make our best changes to the system.
But that's okay. The problem is not fractional reserve banking. The problem is excess. The problem is not that there is more debt than money. The problem is that there is so very much more debt than money.

Up top, Keen has a make-nice intro where he summarizes Shedlock's criticisms of his (Keen's) “Modern Debt Jubilee” proposal. Right off the bat we find Mish saying:
Giving money away will not cure any structural issues such as the high cost of education, pension underfunding, medical costs, prevailing wages, student loans, etc., etc.
Indeed, I think it would compound those problems.
I got that far, and knew I was gonna write this post. Keen seems not to focus on this particular criticism by Mish. I picked up on it right away.
The purpose of a debt jubilee is not to "give money away". The purpose is to reduce debt. If Mish misunderstands that, then Mish misunderstands the economic problem.
Debt has accumulated to the point that the economy can no longer function as we need it to function, because of the cost of that debt. Nothing could be simpler. If we want to have an economy that is not dysfunctional, the one essential thing is to reduce debt.
Keen understands this. Mish, apparently, does not.
Friday, July 20, 2012
Credit is a sandwich
Credit is a sandwich. Debt does not circulate. Money is a medium of exchange.
The act of lending puts credit to use. But credit is a two-layer sandwich. The borrower peels off the money-layer and spends it into circulation. The borrower is left with the debt-layer, which does not circulate.
When the borrower peels off the money and spends it, the money goes into circulation and becomes indistinguishable from non-borrowed money. To the recipient, it *IS* non-borrowed money. This is how credit-money becomes non-credit-money.
However, the debt remains. The cost of circulating the money, remains. The drag on the economy, remains.
Thursday, July 19, 2012
A bit of history, plus plus
From St. Louis, from the Working Papers, U.S. Monetary Policy: A View from Macro Theory (PDF, 20 pages) by William T. Gavin and Benjamin D. Keen:
The state of the art in macroeconomics has changed dramatically since the 1960s. Models built then had fixed parameters that predicted aggregate outcomes without taking account of how expectations about future policy would affect peoples behavior. As late as 1975, the state of the art was an optimal control model with fixed parameters. The model was useful in guiding spaceships to the moon and in developing optimal input policies for manufacturing machines, but it could not predict how policy could achieve macroeconomic stabilization because it did not take account of how people would change their behavior when new policies were introduced.
The first major breakthrough in modern macro theory was the rational expectations revolution in which economists learned how to put forward-looking behavior in the linear IS/LM model. For the policy advisor, an important contribution of this literature was to teach us that we should not use models with backward-looking inflation expectations to perform counterfactual policy simulations.
Once economists realized the insights and benefits from using models in which people formed expectations optimally, it was natural to move to models in which all behavior was assumed to be optimizing. The second major breakthrough, then, was the first DSGE model the real business cycle (RBC) model developed by Kydland and Prescott (1982). This model begins with households that maximize utility and firms that maximize profits. The single driving process in this model was a stochastic technology factor.
The DSGE policy model has monetary policy operating with an interest rate rule. Until the late 1990s, models usually assumed the money supply was an exogenous autoregressive process. Gavin, Keen, and Pakko (2005) show that these models cannot account for the time-series properties of inflation and market interest rates. The state-of-the-art policy model today is a New Keynesian DSGE model with sticky prices and Taylor-type interest rate rules.
The first major breakthrough in modern macro theory was the rational expectations revolution in which economists learned how to put forward-looking behavior in the linear IS/LM model. For the policy advisor, an important contribution of this literature was to teach us that we should not use models with backward-looking inflation expectations to perform counterfactual policy simulations.
Once economists realized the insights and benefits from using models in which people formed expectations optimally, it was natural to move to models in which all behavior was assumed to be optimizing. The second major breakthrough, then, was the first DSGE model the real business cycle (RBC) model developed by Kydland and Prescott (1982). This model begins with households that maximize utility and firms that maximize profits. The single driving process in this model was a stochastic technology factor.
The DSGE policy model has monetary policy operating with an interest rate rule. Until the late 1990s, models usually assumed the money supply was an exogenous autoregressive process. Gavin, Keen, and Pakko (2005) show that these models cannot account for the time-series properties of inflation and market interest rates. The state-of-the-art policy model today is a New Keynesian DSGE model with sticky prices and Taylor-type interest rate rules.
From a footnote in that paper: "Our model is solved and estimated using the techniques embedded in the Dynare software."
What is Dynare? Dynare is a free software...
Wednesday, July 18, 2012
The falling tree makes no sound, but one hand clapping does
At 3spoken, Neil writes
The debate over reserves is over and I think its pretty clear now that banks are not constrained by their reserves in any system with a floating exchange rate where the central bank is trying to maintain an interest rate.
But "trying to maintain an interest rate" IS A POLICY DECISION ABOUT RESERVES. It is the decision not to constrain banks by their reserves.
There was a time, Neil, when interest rates went up. There will be such times, again.
Tuesday, July 17, 2012
IMF: What Are Economic Models?
One more result from my google search for economic model, this time from the International Monetary Fund. Just to class up the series.
THE MODERN ECONOMY is a complex machine...
So far, so good.
An economic model is a simplified description of reality, designed to yield hypotheses about economic behavior that can be tested.
Oops. "Designed to yield hypotheses about human behavior". Nope, that's micro economics. Why is this so hard for people to understand???
If the economy was really good, maybe I could see it. But it's not good, and it hasn't been good for years. And it wasn't good 10 years ago, and it wasn't good 30 years ago, and it wasn't good 40 years ago. Mostly, it's not good anymore.
You think that's because of human behavior? Pffft! There are macro problems.
It's because of monetary balances: changes in monetary balances over generations. You know: You call it inequitable distribution of wealth and income. That's part of it.
There are two broad classes of economic models—theoretical and empirical. Theoretical models seek to derive verifiable implications about economic behavior under the assumption that agents maximize specific objectives subject to constraints that are well defined in the model (for example, an agent’s budget).
Behavior, again.
In contrast, empirical models aim to verify the qualitative predictions of theoretical models and convert these predictions to precise, numerical outcomes.
Boy, that sounds awfully empty to me. You think the concentration of wealth is because of economic behavior? You think the stagnation of median family income is because of behavior? You think unacceptable levels of unemployment is because of behavior? I don't.
Despite their diversity, empirical economic models have features in common. Each will allow for inputs, or exogenous variables, which do not need to be explained by the model. These include policy variables, such as government spending and tax rates, or nonpolicy variables, like the weather. Then there are the outputs, called dependent variables (for example, the inflation rate), which the model will seek to explain when some or all of the exogenous variables come into play.
Every empirical model will also have coefficients that determine how a dependent variable changes when an input changes (for example, the responsiveness of household consumption to a $100 decrease in income tax). Such coefficients are usually estimated (assigned numbers) based on historical data. Last, empirical model builders add a catchall variable to each behavioral equation to account for idiosyncrasies of economic behavior at the individual level. (In the example above, agents will not respond identically to a $100 tax rebate.)
So: We should concern ourselves with government spending and tax rates, and the weather, and the coefficients, and the response to a hundred-dollar tax cut. And that's how we should explain the economy?
Not on my blog.
All economic models, no matter how complicated, are subjective approximations of reality designed to explain observed phenomena. It follows that the model’s predictions must be tempered by the randomness of the underlying data it seeks to explain and by the validity of the theories used to derive its equations.
A good example is the ongoing debate over existing models’ failure to predict or untangle the reasons for the recent global financial crisis. Insufficient attention to the links between overall demand, wealth, and—in particular—excessive financial risk taking has been blamed. In the next few years there will be considerable research into uncovering and understanding the lessons from the crisis. This research will add new behavioral equations to current economic models.
In particular, "excessive financial risk taking" is a microeconomic phenomenon. The problem is not that some people were taking excessive financial risk. The problem is that the accumulation of financial risk became too great, because the accumulation of financing became too great, because policymakers thought it was a good thing and they encouraged it, right up to the end.
Their policies are the problem. Our policies.
// Part 4 of 4
Monday, July 16, 2012
Faith and Finance: What Is An Economic Model?
My google search for economic model also returned What Is An Economic Model?, by Tim. Here is his opening:
Economics is built on a model that assumes people are rational. This means that people will act in a way that is to maximize something and also work to produce the most favorable outcome. Though it sounds simple in theory, finding perfectly rational people in real life is nearly impossible. This is where the economic man comes into play. He is the perfectly reasonable person who makes decisions based on costs, scarcity and a sound analysis.
Yeah, but not for me.
I don't care if people are rational. At work they say "It is what it is." I'm not sure what that means. But I know that people are what they are, and it's not up to me to explain their behavior.
I want to explain the economy. I want to explain that environment in which people go about their business: how the environment changes, and why it changes, and what drives the change. People sometimes kick this back to me, arguing that people make all the decisions, so the economy is just people. No.
Yes and no. Yes, people make all the decisions. But no, because it's not always the same world. Sometimes the environment supports a healthy and growing economy. Sometimes it doesn't. Sometimes (like shortly after World War Two) profits are naturally high. Sometimes (like 30 years after World War Two) profits have withered or waned or competed themselves away. Simetimes (like recently) profits are unnaturally high. These different circumstances are part of the economic environment, and they help explain why people behave differently in different times.
And profit is only one example.
// Part 3 of 4
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